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#### Easing the embargo erases anti-neoliberal progress – Cuba is sustainable now because of it, but removing it speeds up the effects of neoliberalism

Gonzalez ‘3 (Carmen, Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, p. 685, 2003, “Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba”, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987944>)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external—the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era.410 It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path.

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415

It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418

Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation.

The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### The alternative is to vote negative to endorse a radical break from neoliberal market society. Piecemeal reforms like the permutation reinforce the incalculable everyday violence of market fundamentalism. Every impact is symptomatic of the neoliberal authoritarian impulse that necessarily results in global omnicide.

Giroux 9/25/13

Henry, currently holds the Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University, “Beyond Savage Politics and Dystopian Nightmares”

What kind of society emerges when it is governed by **the market-driven assumption** that the only value that matters is exchange value, when the common good is denigrated to the status of a mall, and the social order is composed only of individuals free to pursue their own interests? What happens to democracy when a government inflicts on the American public narrow market-driven values, corporate relations of power and policies that impose gross inequities on society, and condemns young people to a life of precarity in which the future begins to resemble a remake of dystopian films such as Mad Max (1979), Brazil (1985), RoboCop (1987), Minority Report (2002), District Nine (2009), Comopolis (2012) and The Purge (2013). What makes American society distinct in the present historical moment is a culture and social order that has not only lost its moral bearings but produces a level of symbolic and real violence whose visibility and existence set a new standard for cruelty, humiliation and the **mechanizations of a mad war machine,** all of which serve the interests of the political and corporate **walking dead -** the new avatars of death and cruelty - **that plunder the social order**.[i] Unfortunately, the dark and dire images of America’s dysimagination machine made visible endlessly in all the mainstream cultural apparatuses have been exceeded by a society rooted in a savage politics in which **extreme forms of violence** have become both spectacle and modus operandi of how American society governs and entertains itself. Evidence of the decay of American democracy is not only found in the fact that the government is now controlled by a handful of powerful right-wing and corporate interests, it is also increasingly made manifest in the daily acts of cruelty and violence that shroud that American landscape like a vast and fast-moving dust storm. Unspeakable violence, extending from the murder of young people and children at Columbine High School, Virginia Tech University and Sandy Hook Elementary School, to name a few, to the recent mass shootings at Fort Hood, Texas, and the Washington Navy Yard give credence to the notion that violence now **becomes the most important** **element of power and mediating force** in shaping social relationships. Mass violence has become so routine that it no longer evokes visceral responses from the public. For instance, when such violence engulfs major cities such as Chicago, the public barely blinks. And as the mass shootings increase, they will barely be covered by mainstream media, who have no critical language by which to engage such events except as aberrations with no systemic causes. The line between the spectacle of violence and the reality of everyday violence has become blurred, making it difficult to respond to and understand the origins of symbolic and institutional violence in the economic, political and social formations that now rule American society. Violence has become so normalized that **it no longer has a history**. That is, its political and economic structures have become invisible, and the painful memories it evokes disappear quickly among the barrage of spectacles of violence and advertisements addressing us not as moral beings but as customers seeking new commodities, instant pleasure and ever-shocking thrills. At the same time, violence in America is fed by a culture of fear - shaped, in part, by a preoccupation with surveillance, incarceration and **the personal security industry.** And, as a result, American society has made “a sinister turn towards intense social control,”[ii] and a “political culture of hyper punitiveness.” [iii] The tentacles of this high-intensity violence, now normalized, reach into **every** aspect of society - a spectacle that does not unsettle but **thrives** on more shocks, more bloodshed and more suffering. The political, corporate and intellectual zombies that rule America love death-dealing institutions, which accounts for why they rarely criticize the bloated military budget and the rise of the incarceration and punishing state. They embrace the demands of an empire that kills innocent people with automated drones and sanctions torture and are all too willing to raise their voices to fever pitch to promote war as the only viable tool of diplomacy. Witness the almost-hysterical displays of public anger by Sens. John McCain and Lindsay Graham over President Barack Obama’s decision to avert bombing Syria in favor of a diplomatic solution. State violence is now the sanctioned norm of rule in a society in which political fanatics, such as Ted Cruz, Paul Ryan and Sen. Marco Rubio define policy according to a friend/enemy distinction and in doing so **transform politics into** an extension of **war**. Unrelenting in their role as archetypes of the hyper-dead, the Tea Party fanatics and their gutless allies spectacularize hatred and trade in fear, lies and misinformation while trying to hold the American public and the government hostage to their fanatical market-driven principles. We are witnessing the militarization of all aspects of American politics and life, and one consequence is a **growing authoritarianism** in which democracy becomes **its ultimate victim.** No sphere is immune from this madness. For instance, Ohio State University, as a result of a gift from military surplus, has added an armored military vehicle to its campus security forces - all the better to inculcate not only the values of militarization in young students but also a culture of fear, violence, thoughtlessness and insecurity.[iv] Local police forces now resemble SWAT teams and make clear that force is the most important way to address not just criminal behavior but also social problems.[v] Images of the police do not simply saturate television dramas, they have become the most visible humans occupying public schools. Needless to say, violence is not just visible in the spectacle of entertainment or in the visibility of **deep-rooted economic inequalities** arrogantly defended by the rich; it is also discernible in the everyday actions and small change of daily interactions as the punishing state injects the ideology of violence into legislation designed to cripple and impose pain upon large segments of the population regarded as disposable, excess and unworthy of social supports. For instance, the cutting of $40 billion from the food stamp program (SNAP) by the mostly wealthy, white, right-wing extremists that make up the Republican Party members of the House of Representatives exemplifies the new face of a savage politics. In responding to the cuts, Timothy Egan, an opinion writer for The New York Times, stresses rightly the cruelty implicit in this piece of legislation and what it says about the extremists driving the Republican Party. He writes: The Republican-dominated House passed a bill that would deprive 3.8 million people of assistance to buy food next year. ... A Republican majority that refuses to govern on other issues found the votes to shove nearly 4 million people back into poverty, joining 46.5 million at a desperation line that has failed to improve since the dawn of the Great Recession. It’s a heartless bill, aimed to hurt. Republicans don’t see it that way, of course. They think too many of their fellow citizens are cheats and loafers, dining out on lobster.[vi] What Egan fails to point out is that “an estimated 210,000 children will lose access to free school lunch programs and 55,000 jobs will be lost in the first year of cuts alone.”[vii] He also fails to mention that the war being waged on food stamps by the Republican Party is symptomatic of a larger war waged against the poor. Being poor in America means that one has no moral stature and is subject to a variety of state intrusions, such as drug testing, that assume that the poor are criminals. **Being poor has become a crime,** and when coupled with the now-commonplace racially inflected language of "us vs. them" so prominent among right-wing politicians, the ugly poison of bigotry and racism once again is on full display as part of an effort to promote Jim Crow legislation, revealing the white supremacist ideology that characterizes the extremists leading the Republican Party. The new extremists are not simply political loons out of touch with America, as some critics describe them. They are the face of the emerging counter-revolution taking over the nation - an updated and kinder **version of the** fascist **brownshirts now dressed in suits carrying black briefcases and living in guarded communities**. They are the dark angels of violence, and they trade in the mass psychology of fear and hate. They despise compromise and live by a take-no-prisoners political sensibility. They want to eliminate any vestiges of the government that provide social protections. As I mentioned previously, they also want to shut down the government and strip the American public of health care benefits while consolidating power in the hands of a party that, as former President Jimmy Carter pointed out, removed America from the pretense of being a functioning democracy.[viii] But they are not alone. Behind Obama’s facile smile and Ivy League civility lies a not-so-hidden form of authoritarian politics and a mode of ethical barbarism that allows him to believe he has the right to kill people without any recourse to due process, destroy civil liberties and implement the policies of Wall Street gangsters. Whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning who are repulsed by the moral and political abuses of government and have courageously spoken out against such practices are labeled as traitors by the dominant media and many of the politicians bought off by the lobbyists who have made the Congress and White House their second home.[ix] Similarly, the same administration that refused to prosecute those government officials who tortured, maimed, imprisoned and abducted thousands of innocent human beings now condemn those whistleblowers such as Manning, Snowden, and Aaron Swartz, who exposed the political conditions that created them in the first place. The increasing militarization of American society is matched by its **increasing depoliticization and its increasing incapacity to make moral judgments and act** with compassion **against** the most shocking **injustices**. George Lakoff and Elisabeth Wehling are right in arguing that conservatives view the public as immoral and can imagine democracy only as “providing the maximal liberty to seek one’s self interest without being responsible for the interest of others. ... Lack of success implies lack of discipline and character, which means you deserve your poverty.”[x] Moral responsibility is now in full flight condemned to a bygone era when the social contract actually had some meaning. A moral coma has engulfed the United States, as individuals can no longer connect private troubles to broader social and systemic issues. The art of translation, which is crucial to any viable democracy, dissolves into the septic tank of celebrity culture and the dead zone of a market society exemplified in the growing infantilization of a citizenry shaped by the rapid proliferation of a culture of idiocy, civic illiteracy and authoritarianism. Casino capitalism and its right-wing apostles lack any sense of ethics or respect for the social contract and spew feverishly an endless rhetoric of hate and vile over the airwaves. The **unapologetic discourse of racism,** **humiliation and cruelty has become an industry** for the likes of Rush Limbaugh, Michael Savage, Michelle Malkin and politicians of the same ilk who relentlessly describe immigrants as vermin, denounce young student protesters as un-American, argue that women are undeserving of any control over their reproductive rights, resurrect the legacy of Jim Crow by denying poor minorities their voting rights, and take pride in shaming those on welfare as lazy and undeserving of social benefits. For instance, “Georgia state Rep. Terry England compared women to farm animals while discussing an abortion measure on the Georgia state house floor.”[xi] But there is more at stake here than the poisonous rhetoric of racism and class warfare. There is also the rise of a punishing state, which now has the highest incarceration rate in the world, with more than 700 people per 100,000 in prison. This is a punishing machine whose mad violence elevates a hyper-punitiveness over any sense of compassion or respect for the other, especially those who are in need of decent health care, social services and the most basic right to a decent job and life of dignity.[xii] Mass shootings have become the new index of violence in America, but they pale in terms of human destruction and mass suffering with the infliction of hardship and misery imposed on millions of people daily in the United States **under the regime of casino capitalism.** Evidence for the death of the American dream is everywhere: Millions of people have lost their homes, and young people are living with the nightmare of a future without jobs, hopes and security, if not dignity. At the same time, many soldiers returning from the senseless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and suffering from a wide range of illnesses are given shoddy and sometime death-dealing treatment by the veterans’ hospitals. In some cases, they are turned into drug addicts because the hospitals, in their efforts to keep them quiet rather than give them proper treatment, overprescribe painkillers. Unfortunately, such neglect does more than keep them quiet; it often results in their needless deaths. Poor children are denied proper health care and school lunches. The poverty rate in America grows to unimaginable numbers matched only by the increasing growth in income and wealth by the super-rich. The corporate educational reform movement teaches young people how to be stupid and dissolves all vestiges of creativity in the mad frenzy of an audit culture. At the same time, students find themselves in a job market that offers them little but dashed dreams and low-skill jobs, if they are lucky enough to find one. The small change of human cruelty and a savage politics was evident recently in newspaper accounts about the rise of expensive condos in the Upper West Side of Manhattan that have one entrance for the rich and another for “working people who won a city lottery to obtain affordable apartments in the building.”[xiii] There is a larger politics at work here than the obvious class and racist implications. Connect the dots of this particularly racist and class-based policy to the rapidly proliferating decisions on the part of Tea Party politicians to produce policies that force the frail, poor and aged to choose between medicine and food. Or the decision on the part of the state of Nevada to dump “1,500 mental patients onto other states by putting them on Greyhound busses and sen[ding] them over state lines with no prior arrangements with families or other mental hospitals once they arrive.”[xiv] **This is a new kind of authoritarianism** that does not speak in the jingoistic discourse of empowerment, exceptionalism or nationalism. Instead, it defines itself in the language of cruelty, suffering and fear, and it does so with a sneer and an unbridled disdain for those considered disposable. **Neoliberal society mimics the search for purity we have seen in other totalitarian societies.** Right-wing market fundamentalists want to root out those considered defective consumers and citizens, along with allegedly unpatriotic dissidents. They also want to punish the poor and remove their children from the possibility of a quality public education. Hence, they develop schools that are dead zones of the imagination for most children and highly creative classroom environments free of the frenzy of empiricism and test-taking for the children of the rich. It gets worse. In Pennsylvania, right-wing Gov. Tom Corbett and Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter are intent on destroying the public school system. Instead of funding public schools, Corbett and Nutter are intent on crushing the teachers union and supporting vouchers and charter schools. They also are fond of claiming that money can’t help struggling public schools as a pretext for closing more than 23 schools “while building a $400 million state prison.”[xv] As Aaron Kase reports, “Things have gotten so bad that at least one school has asked parents to chip in $613 per student just so they can open with adequate services, which, if it becomes the norm, effectively defeats the purpose of equitable public education, and is entirely unreasonable to expect from the city’s poorer neighborhoods.”[xvi] Vouchers and under-regulated charter schools have become the unapologetic face of a vicious form of casino capitalism waging war on the imagination while imposing a range of harsh and punitive disciplinary methods on teachers and students, particularly low-income and poor white minorities.[xvii] The vast stores of knowledge and human creativity needed by young people to face a range of social, economic and political problems in the future are not simply being deferred, they are **being systematically destroyed.** When the emancipatory potential of education does emerge, it is often couched in the deadening discourse of establishing comfort zones in classrooms as a way of eliminating any pedagogy that provokes, unsettles or educates students to think critically. Critical knowledge and pedagogy are now judged as viable only to the degree that they do not make a student uncomfortable. There is more at stake here than the death of the imagination; there is also the elimination of those modes of **agency that make a democracy possible**. In the face of such cruel injustices, neoliberalism remains mute, disdaining democratic politics by claiming there are no alternatives to casino capitalism. Power in the United States has been uprooted from any respect for public value, the common good and democratic politics. This is not only visible in the fact that 1 percent of the population now owns 40 percent of the nation’s wealth or took home “more than half of the nation’s income,” it is also evident in a culture that normalizes, legitimates and thrives in a politics of humiliation, cruelty, racism and class discrimination.[xviii] Political, moral and economic foundations float free of constraints. Moral and social responsibilities are unmoored, free from any sense of responsibility or accountability in a permanent war state. Repression is now the dominant mantra for all of society. As Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyons point out, the American public has been turned into “security addicts,” ingesting mistrust, suspicion and fear as the new common sense for a security state that seems intent on causing the death of everything that matters in a democracy.[xix] The surveillance state works hard to not only monitor our phone conversations or track our Internet communication but to turn us into consumers, ratchet up the desire to be watched, and enforce new registers of social exclusion between those inside and outside the official temples of consumerism, social rights and captainship itself. Confining, excluding and vigilantism is one register of the new face of authoritarianism in the US. As America enters a historical era dominated by an authoritarian repressive state, the refugee camp as a symbol of exclusion and suffering is everywhere, visible in the material encampments for the homeless, urban ghettoes, jails, detention centers for young people, and in the tents propping up alongside highways that hold the new refugees from the suburbs who have lost their jobs, homes and dignity. The refugee camp also has become a metaphor for those who question authority, because they are increasingly rendered stateless, useless and undesirable. Critical thought is now considered dangerous, discomforting and subject to government prosecution, as is evident in the war being waged against whistleblowers in the name of national (in)security.[xx] The technologies of smart missiles hunt down those considered enemies of the United States, removing the ethical imagination from the horror of the violence it inflicts while solidifying the “victory of technology over ethics.”[xxi] Sorting out populations based on wealth, race, the ability to consume and immigration status is the new face of America. The **pathologies of inequality have come home to roost in America**.[xxii] Moreover, as suffering increases among vast swaths of the population, the corporate elite and rich use the proliferating crises to extract more wealth, profits and resources.[xxiii] Crises become the new rationale for destroying the ideologies, values and institutions that give power to the social contract. [xxiv] The ethos of rabid individualism, hyper-masculinity and a survival-of-the-fittest ethic **has created a society of throwaways** of both goods and people. The savage ethic of economic Darwinism also drives the stories we now tell about ourselves. The state of collective unconsciousness that haunts America has its deepest roots not only in the writings of Friedrich Hyek, Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman and other neoliberal philosophers but also in the increasing merging power of private-sector corporations that, as John Ralston Saul has argued, has its roots in the “anti-democratic underpinnings of Fascist Italy in particular, but also of Nazi Germany.”[xxv] Today this “corporatism [is] so strong it that it has taken the guts out of much of daily democratic life.”[xxvi] Combined with the power of the national surveillance state, it is fair to say, again quoting Saul, that “corporatism, with all of the problems attached to it, is digging itself ever deeper into our society, undermining our society.”[xxvii] Clearly, those words echoed a few years ago were not only prescient but vastly underestimated the growing authoritarianism in the United States, in particular. We now live in a society in which leadership has been usurped by models of **corporate management**, self-interest has triumphed over the ethical imagination, and a respect for others is discarded for the crude instrumental goal of accumulating capital, regardless of the social costs. Intellectuals in too many public spheres have become either dysfunctional or they have sold out. Higher education is no longer the city on the hill. Instead it has become a corporate boardroom/factory in which Bill Gates wannabes govern the university as if it were an outpost of Wall Street. Outside of the boardrooms, intellectual violence prevails aimed largely at faculty and students, who are reduced to either grant writers or consumers. To make matters worse academic knowledge is drowning in firewalls of obtuseness, creating a world of dysfunctional intellectuals, at least those who have tenure. Those who don’t have such security are tied to the harsh rhythm and rituals of contingent subaltern labor and barely make enough money to be able to pay their rent or mounting debts - never mind engage in teaching critically and creatively while writing as a sustained act of dissent. At the same time, the wider culture is sinking under a flood of consumer and celebrity idiocy. There are some who suggest that such critiques of the growing authoritarianism and repression in American society are useless and in the long run do nothing more than reinforce a crippling dystopianism. I think this line of argument is not only wrong but **complicitous** with the very problems it refuses to acknowledge. From a left suffocating in cynicism, there is the argument that people are already aware of these problems, as if neoliberal hegemony does not exist and that its success in building a consensus around its ideology as a mode of common sense is passé. At the same time, liberals detest such criticism because it calls into question the totality of American politics rather than focus on **one issue** and gestures toward a radical restructuring of American society rather than **piecemeal** and useless **reforms**. The call for such a restructuring rather than piecemeal reforms sends liberals into fits of hysteria. Of course, the right in all of its varieties views criticism as a virus that destroys everything they admire about America - a society in which democracy has been eviscerated and largely benefits the top ten percent of the population. Most importantly, the banality of evil lies less in the humdrum cruelty of everyday relations but in its normalization, the depolicitizaton of culture, and, at the present moment, in the reproduction of a neoliberal society that eradicates any vestige of public values, the ethical imagination, social responsibility, civic education and democratic social relations. The enemy is not a market economy but a market society and the breakdown of all forms of social solidarity that inform democratic politics and the cultural, political and economic institutions that make it possible. The authoritarianism that now shapes American society is not a matter of fate but one rooted in organized struggle and a vision built on the recognition that there are always alternatives to the existing order that speak to the promise of a **democracy to come**. The contradictions of neoliberalism are unraveling, but the consensus that informs it is alive and well. And it is at that level of educational intervention that the war against market authoritarianism in all of its diverse forms has to be fought first. Commonsense has become the enemy of critical thought. Hope is no longer part of the discourse of the left, only a dreary sense of despair with no vision of how to imagine a radical democracy. Manufactured ignorance has become a virtue instead of a liability in a society ruled by the financial elite. And as such we have no serious crisis of ideas. Instead, we have a crisis of power relations and structures that needs a new political language if it is to be contested at the level of both a pedagogical and political struggle. The current neoliberal drive to ruthlessly extend the never-ending task of accumulating capital is matched only by its ruthless determination to produce a notion of common sense that reinforces the idea that **there is no way to think beyond the present system**. The American public needs to break the authoritarian dysimagination machine that affirms everyone as a consumer and reduces freedom to unchecked self-interest while reproducing subjects who are willingly complicit with the plundering of the environment, resources and public goods by the financial elite. Class and racial warfare are alive and well in the United States. In fact, racism and the class warfare waged by right-wing politicians, bankers, hedge fund managers and the corporate rich are intensifying. Americans need to reject a politics in which public goods are demonized and eradicated, African-American youths become the fodder for wars abroad and the military-prison-industrial complex, the underclass disappears, public servants are disparaged, youths vanish into debt and despair, and the middle class passes into oblivion. While politics must be connected to its material moorings, it is not enough to imagine a different future than the one that now hangs over us like a suffocating sandstorm. Those intellectuals, workers, young people, artists and others committed to a radical democracy need to develop a new vocabulary about how to think about the meaning of politics, human agency and the building of a formative culture through which organized collective struggles can develop in the effort to imagine a new and more democratic future.

## Alloys

#### The threat of bioweapons projects our worst anxieties onto the other—it demarcates a line between us and them that legitimizes violent US policy

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(Rodney, Comparative Program on Health and Society, completing the second year of his SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellowship. Prior, he was resident at the Department of Human and Community Development at the University of California, Davis. Rodney completed his B.A. at the University of Calgary, his M.A. at Carleton University and received his Ph.D. (Political Science) from York University in June, 2002. “The New 'Biomania' and US Foreign Policy.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004 [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72793\_index.html Finished p. 12](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72793_index.html%20Finished%20p.%2012))

Over the past few years, and especially pronounced since the US mobilization for war in Iraq, foreign policy channels (official, journalistic and academic) have fixated on ‘weapons of mass destruction’ or WMD. It seems that WMD are anywhere and everywhere, and while nuclear technology tends to take center stage in this epic struggle, chemical and biological weapons run a close second. Indeed, the prospect of ‘bioterror’ is regularly depicted as one of the more chilling threat possibilities considered by the US foreign policy establishment in some time. So much so, that in a prominent foreign policy journal, biological threats have been demarcated as ‘special’, requiring concerned officials to shed the strategic fetters of Cold War thought. 1 Equipped with a bevy of threatening potentialities, analysts and policymakers alike urge the American population – and the Western world – to act with determination and good sense, before it is too late. Assuming for the moment that biological warfare or large-scale bioterror represents a likely – even possible – future scenario, there is nothing remarkable in surmising that its unique technical characteristics might warrant specialized forms of response. It would, however, be a mammoth leap of faith to the conclusion that it is any emergent ‘new thinking’ which drives the current ‘biomania’ within intellectual and policy practice – a practice that evinces more continuity than discontinuity with Cold War thought patterns. As with policies of the Cold War, current US foreign policy surrounding the question of biological weapons and bioterror is rife with contradiction, and it can in no way be disconnected from the socio-economic configuration of American society. This paper argues that the current **US disposition towards bioterror is premised on a powerful threat discourse** which is, at once, highly problematic and conducive to a narrow band of US interests. The current quest for **‘protection’ from bioterror part of a general discursive strategy that demarcates a civilised America**n way of life **from the foreign** and deadly intersection of ‘envy’ and ‘pathology’, but it also supplies a material foil with which the state furthers its now well developed social role in bolstering innovation-led US economic clout. To this end, the paper is divided into three parts. The first section highlights the vigour with which bioterror has been deployed as a threat discourse. Utilising the arguments of David Campbell, it suggests that despite the weak basis upon which this threat discourse has been constructed, it nevertheless renders an ambiguous but trenchant danger, against which US policy and disposition are vindicated. Beyond the internal self- validation of US practice, however, the paper further explores underlying social interests which better explains the particular trajectories of US policy. It does this by considering US actions in relation to multilateral efforts concerning biological weapons. Bringing both military and corporate interests to the forefront, it explores the reasons underlying the US Administration’s contradictory desire to scuttle multilateral efforts at strengthening a biological weapons regime. In the final section, the paper reconnects formal US foreign policy with public policy related to ‘preparedness’, demonstrating that the centerpiece of this ‘foreign policy within’ is, again, deeply entwined with socio- economic interests. The Rational/Irrational Threat: In the vernacular of foreign policy, the logic of protection now aimed at terrorism possesses both emotive and practical currency. This logic was certainly operational prior to the events of 2001, but quite clearly the post-September 11 milieu has supplied an enormous emotive fuel to arguments concerning terrorist threat. The spectre of terror does not usually require great detail of argumentation or detailed evidence to raise. Through a range of venues, US citizens and policymakers are quite regularly warned that while terrorists’ identity cannot be easily isolated, …we can deduce that they are very clever, have superior organizational ability, are manifestly ruthless, and are willing to take a long-term approach to planning and carrying out attacks. Their operatives are fanatics, willing to die to accomplish their missions. 2 Under such summations, the audience is generally asked to reconcile and internalize competing claims about terrorists (and this logic also applies to the depiction of leadership in so-called ‘rogue states’). Specifically, the behaviour of terrorists are characterized as simultaneously rational and irrational. In this way, the symbol of the terrorist serves a productive discursive purpose, exhorting citizens to understand and fear the potential for fanaticism or psychosis immanent in America’s enemies while, at the same time, never to underestimate their strategic (and instrumental) capability to induce large-scale harm. Ultimately, **a foreign policy discourse that oscillates in its depiction of the enemy** between the ‘devious schemer’ and the ‘lunatic’ **performs a powerful task in relation to threat construction**, appealing both to citizens’ reasonable logic of possibility and their fear of the unknown. 3 Similarly, as of late, the handling of bioterror has exhibited considerable changes.. Prior to 9/11, government agencies exercised some reserve in characterizing the viability and severity of threat based on biological weapons. For instance, a prominent and 2 Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Rethinking Bioterrorism,” Current History 100 (2001), p.438. 3 The latter can never be meant seriously in the context of US foreign policy for at least two reasons, both of which can be attributed to Terry Eagleton. The first is that any serious attempt to label a violent political act as the product of the ‘irrational’ or ‘pathological’ would imply that its perpetrators are, at least in a legal sense, without responsibility. Second, that the foreign policy establishment has devoted countless resources towards understanding the networks, mechanisms, goals and likely future acts suggests that there is no serious assumption of an operative irrationality. Terry Eagleton, “The Art of Terror,” Lecture Series, University of Toronto, 28 January 2004. influential report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) was taken seriously by lawmakers, when it stated that, …in most cases terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges to successfully make and release chemical or biological agents of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people without substantial assistance from a state sponsor…. [S]pecialized knowledge is required in the manufacturing process and in improvising an effective delivery device for most chemical and nearly all biological agents that could be used in terrorist attacks. Moreover, some of the required components of chemical agents and highly infective strains of biological agents are difficult to obtain. 4 This is not to say that there was an absence of concern about the circulation, even possible use, of a biological weapon. 5 However, a much greater urgency has been attached to biological weapons, based largely on the additional factor of the post-9/11 terrorist imagery.Hardly limited to the conventional foreign policy establishment, even the US Secretary of Health Tommy Thompson has stated confidently that, “enemies seek, and in some cases have already obtained, the ability to acquire and manipulate biological, chemical and nuclear weapons that could penetrate our military defenses and civilian surveillance systems and cause significant harm.” 6 Administration policy and Congressional oversight are currently replete with invocations of open-ended biological threat possibilities, that not only point to the resourcefulness and cunning of America’s ‘enemies’, but it also relies on their less than rational characterisation. As W.J. “Billy’ Tauzin, Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, interprets the potentiality of bioterrorism, “We don’t think like evil people in America. Evil people think different [sic] than we do – we have to force ourselves to think pre-emptively.” 7 It is critical to note that the certitude with which the US foreign policy establishment speaks to the issue of bioterror emerges largely out of a subjunctive reality. In both intellectual and policymaking circles, there is almost a ritualistic citing of case evidence, followed by a thinly-constructed assertion that large-scale bioterror is undeniably on the horizon. This introduction of a new reality usually includes reference to the attempts by the Rajneeshees in 1984 to infect local salad bars with Salmonella; Aum Shinrikyo’s unsuccessful work with biological pathogens; the destruction of the twin towers; and the subsequent discovery of Anthrax in powder form in the Fall of 2001. 8 Strangely, of course, none of these events provide any particularly compelling evidence that bioterrorism is a likely – or even probable – scenario. Even proponents of large-scale bioterrorism preparedness, such as Amy Smithson, insist that, “rubbing some type of an anthrax substance on a keyboard is not a mass casualty dispersal attempt,” and that, “Aum’s germ weapons program…was a flop from start to finish because the technical obstacles were so significant.” 9 Indeed, a far more damning evaluation is provided by Milton Leitenberg, who not only takes apart the precedent-setting rendition these events, but states pointedly that a detailed examination by the RAND Corporation of 15 terrorist-labeled groups, “demonstrated virtually zero evidence of efforts to produce biological agents.” 10 **Sobering counter-evidence, however, has little effect on the discursive muscle of consecutive ‘what if?’ statements**, the cumulative effect of which is to equate the identification of any potential ‘vulnerability’ with the palpable existence of threat. **Inflated threat discourse** has been a staple of US foreign policy for some time. To date, some of the best analysis of this discourse has been undertaken by David Campbell. In Campbell’s central work, Writing Security, he tracks the powerful discursive trends which guide US policy before, during and after the Cold War. 11 Beyond this, he states a compelling case for the critical role of foreign policy in the constitution of the domestic political scene, as well as the wider domain of American identity. Campbell points out that a common thread of the foreign policy establishment, broadly understood, is its reproduction and renewal of ‘danger discourse’ – a recurring invocation of externally emanating threats to the well being of American society. Here, The global inscription of danger was something that long preceded the cold war, but it was in the cold war, when numerous overseas obligations were constructed, that the identity of the United States became even more deeply implicated in the external reach of the state…. [C]oncomitant with this external expansion was an internal magnification of the modes of existence which were to be interpreted as risks.Danger was being totalized in the external realm in conjunction with its increased individualization in the internal field, with the result being the reconstitution of the borders of the state’s identity. 12 Campbell in no way tries to explain away Soviet practices as a mere discursive chimera. He states repeatedly that Soviet policies exhibited a range of troubling patterns, but it remains important to note their **representation in foreign policy discourse in no way required adherence to historical reality**. Instead, the ‘parade of horribles’ fundamentally associated to the Soviet Union’s existence provided the basis for both a highly militarized American society, as well as a powerful narrowing of the legitimate boundaries of political challenge within a liberal-democratic, market society. In the aftermath of post-1989 political realignments in Europe, it became abundantly clear that foreign policy intellectuals and practitioners were on the market for new ‘threats’. 13 And Campbell captures this new milieu by arguing that, “…the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of **political discourse, reproducing the identity of ‘the U**nited **S**tates’ and containing challenges to it is likely to require new discourses of danger.” 14 In this sense, **the newly refurbished threat of bioterror most certainly fits the bill, in that it offers** an interconnected international and domestic terrain of **open-ended threat possibilities**. As so many intellectual and political practitioners want to suggest, the risks now associated to biological weapons are limited only by the psychosis of perpetrators – a truly dangerous world. 15 There is, of course, much to contest here. Even if one were to leave aside the extensive role of state terror orchestrated around the world, not the least of which has been endorsed or organized by US administrations, it is difficult to reconcile the ostensible desire to protect citizens’ health from bioterror and the ongoing dilemma of public and personal health in the American context. As Leitenberg rightly points out, roughly 30,000 people die from influenza A and B each year; more than 750,000 cases of sepsis occur annually, of which 215,000 die; weight-related death kills 300,000 per year; and 440,000 yearly deaths are tobacco-related. 16 This is only a tiny smattering of the public and personal health challenges facing American society, but it offers a striking contrast to the highly ambiguous certitude with which bioterrorist threats are now regularly invoked. This ambiguity gives rise to a fairly obvious question: is there a genuine object of protection in the emergent foreign and domestic policy continuum surrounding biological weapons and bioterror? The logic of Campbell’s argument would suggest that it is nothing less than the reproduction of the very domestic identity that separates the US from the ‘uncivilised’ world. As such, **bioterror has been called up in conjunction with a range of other ‘new’ threats,** in a manner **that reasserts the necessity of both the US**’ international role and its very **constitutive identity as** a bulwark of **rational, democratic and peaceful Western values**. While this reproductive logic of threat discourse renders considerable insight into the operationalisation of power in the American political context, it is, nonetheless, worth considering whether the particular (and emphatic) invocation of biological terror can be grounded in the specific interests of prevailing social relations. Here, grappling with the material (social) purpose of political ordering via foreign policy is not, in my view, a betrayal of Campbell’s discursive approach. Instead, along the lines of the Michel Foucault, “…political power goes much deeper than one suspects…. if one fails to recognize these points of support of class power, one risks allowing them to continue to exist and to see this class power reconstitute itself even after an apparent revolutionary process.” 17 As one of Campbell’s main intellectual supports, Foucault consistently makes clear that discerning the operationalisation of power does not eschew underlying state coercive and class power. For observers of the current ‘biomania’ in foreign policy, this demands the interpretation and articulation of underlying motivations that help drive this vague yet **powerful threat discourse.** Effecting Security?

#### The aff obscures the metaphorical roots of nuclear policy by presenting their arguments as literal truth – this only reinforces the most dangerous symbolic categories of nuclear weapons and makes nuclear war more likely

Chernus ‘86– Ira Chernus. professor of religious studies university of Colorado at boulder. University of South Caroline 1986 “Dr. Strangegod.” Page 153-156

Moreover, even if we could imagine the reality of nuclear war in purely literal terms, there is good reason to believe that we should not follow this path. Literal thinking and literal language impose a particular mode of thought and feeling, one that is intimately linked with the Bomb and its symbolism. Literalism insists that in every situation there is one single meaning and one single truth to be found. Thus it divides the world into true and false, right and wrong, good and evil, with no middle ground allowed. It is the characteristic language of a culture bent on an apocalyptic crusade to wipe out all evil. It allows no ground for a unified vision of good and evil or life and death together. At the same time, literalism underscores our psychic numbing. With its statistics, computer projections, and abstract theoretical models, the literal approach reduces the world to a set of finite means and ends, each with a single simple meaning. It fails to grasp the complexities of human reality and human response. It creates a dehumanized world, amenable to manipulation and control, in which we learn to see other people and ultimately ourselves as mere inert objects. It is the characteristic language of a technological culture that has made a death-machine its deity. The inert words of literalism create an inert world, in which every thing is just the thing it is and can be nothing else. In this one-dimensional world it is increasingly difficult to give possible realities and imagined realities any meaningful place. So we are prevented by our mode of speaking and thinking from exploring genuine alternatives to the existing situation. We are also prevented from recognizing the reality and power of our symbolisms and fantasies. Since we define literal truth as the only valid form of truth. we deny that our unconscious processes have any valid truth at all So literalism becomes part of the process of psychological repression. This is especially dangerous in the nuclear age, when the difference between literal reality and fantasy is so hard to find. With fantasy images affecting us so powerfully, we must exert ever more powerful processes of repression. One way to achieve this is simply to intensify our numbing-to refuse to feel at all. Another way is to project our inner thoughts and feelings onto external objects-to make the Enemy responsible for all the anger and hatred and dark feeling that wells up inside us. As numbing reinforces our commitment to dehumanizing technology, projection reinforces our commitment to the apocalyptic crusade against the Enemy. So literalism again ties together both our ways of thinking about the Bomb and our efforts to avoid thinking about it. Yet even the most ardent literalism cannot banish the symbolic dimensions of our minds and our symbolic responses to the Bomb. Indeed, our conviction that literal truth is the only truth paradoxically strengthens the grip of symbolic meanings. The more literalism starves our supply of symbolic thinking and feeling, the more it feeds our hunger, and the more intensively we cling to our symbols. Since we are convinced that these nuclear symbols are actually literal realities, they take even deeper root in our psyches. When warnings of the dire reality of nuclear war are cast in purely literal terms, they are received on the symbolic level (even if we consciously deny this) and their threatening aspect is largely nullified. Perhaps this explains, in part, the relatively limited success of the nuclear disarmament movement. The movement has tried to move us from the level of numbing to the level of awareness by urging us to imagine the literal horrors of nuclear war. Yet its alarms have fallen largely on deaf ears. The movement itself has explained this deafness by pointing to the conflict between the first two levels of awareness and numbing. But in its commitment to literal thinking it has ignored the third level of symbolic meaning. This literalism is just part of a larger picture-the disarmament movement's roots in the liberal humanism of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. This rationalistic humanism strips the issue of its religious and psychological complexities and sees it as a purely ethical matter: humanism and life against global death, one value against another. It assumes that ethical problems must be resolved by literal factual analysis and clear logical analysis alone. It assumes, furthermore, that all people are rational and can be shown the convergence of morality and self-interest. Therefore the movement puts all its energies into education based solely on facts and logical arguments. Yet it is clear that the nuclear issue goes beyond ethical considerations, and it is equally clear that the antinuclear campaign cannot succeed merely by stressing the irrationality of nuclear armament, for the Bomb's nonrational symbolic meanings lie at the heart of its appeal. Moreover, the Enlightenment tradition still links its faith in rationality to a belief in "progress," which means the triumph of the forces of life over the forces of death. Yet all these Enlightenment values are the very values held just as fervently by nuclear policymakers, strategists, and political and military leaders. We have seen ample evidence that they too put their faith in logical analysis and the triumph of life over death, always holding the opposites apart. And proponents of nuclear armament have always couched their arguments in the most literal terms. The media have largely accepted this literal treatment and passed it along to the general public. Media presentations of the issue have been saturated with symbolic meanings that have gone unrecognized as symbolism because we have assumed that all truth must be literal truth. So the disarmament movement's own roots are closely intertwined with the roots of the very tree it hopes to fell. As long as it fails to recognize the role of symbolism and the irrational in the psyche, it will fail to grasp the fascinating, appealing qualities of the Bomb. If we are to "imagine the real," the first step is to understand that the reality we must imagine is largely a symbolic reality that crosses the line between literalism and fantasy.

#### Bioweapons are ineffective, expensive, and inefficient

Stratfor 7, private intelligence agency, analyzes geopolitical trends, 12/21/ (“Bioterrorism: Sudden Death Overtime?,” http://www2.stratfor.com/analysis/bioterrorism\_sudden\_death\_overtime)

In this season of large college bowl games and the National Football League playoffs in the United States, and large nonsporting events such as the New Year’s Eve celebration in New York’s Times Square — not to mention the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing — a discussion of bioterrorism and the threat it poses might be of interest. First, it must be recognized that during the past several decades of the modern terrorist era, biological weapons have been used very infrequently — and there are some very good reasons for this. Contrary to their portrayal in movies and television shows, biological agents are difficult to manufacture and deploy effectively in the real world. In spite of the fear such substances engender, even in cases in which they have been somewhat effective they have proven to be less effective and more costly than more conventional attacks using firearms and explosives. In fact, nobody even noticed what was perhaps the largest malevolent deployment of biological agents in history, in which thousands of gallons of liquid anthrax and botulinum toxin were released during several attacks in a major metropolitan area over a three-year period. This use of biological agents was perpetrated by the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo. An examination of the group’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program provides some important insight into biological weapons, their costs — and their limitations. In the late 1980s, Aum’s team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-of-the-art biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even tried to acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Between April of 1990 and August of 1993, Aum conducted seven large-scale attacks involving the use of thousands of gallons of biological agents — four with anthrax and three with botulinum toxin. The group’s first attempts at unleashing mega-death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April of 1990, Aum used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the Diet and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport in Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of agent released, there were no mass casualties and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the attacks had taken place. When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aum’s scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their biological weapons facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax, and between June and August of 1993 the group sprayed thousands of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time Aum not only employed its fleet of sprayer trucks, but also use sprayers mounted on the roof of their headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, the attacks produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the group’s successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had occurred. Aum Shinrikyo’s team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. The team worked in large, modern facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. Despite the millions of dollars the group spent on its bioweapons program, it still faced problems in creating virulent biological agents, and it also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively. Even when the group switched to employing a nerve agent, it only succeeded in killing a handful of people. A comparison between the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attack and the jihadist attack against the Madrid trains in 2004 shows that chemical/biological attacks are more expensive to produce and yield fewer results than attacks using conventional explosives. In the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack — Aum’s most successful — the group placed 11 sarin-filled plastic bags on five different subway trains and killed 12 people. In the 2004 Madrid attack, jihadists detonated 10 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and killed 191 people. Aum’s CBW program cost millions and took years of research and effort; the Madrid bombings only cost a few thousand dollars, and the IEDs were assembled in a few days. The most deadly biological terrorism attack to date was the case involving a series of letters containing anthrax in the weeks following the Sept. 11 attacks — a case the FBI calls Amerithrax. While the Amerithrax letters did cause panic and result in companies all across the country temporarily shutting down if a panicked employee spotted a bit of drywall dust or powdered sugar from doughnuts eaten by someone on the last shift, in practical terms, the attacks were very ineffective. The Amerithrax letters resulted in five deaths; another 22 victims were infected but recovered after receiving medical treatment. The letters did not succeed in infecting senior officials at the media companies targeted by the first wave of letters, or Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, who were targeted by a second wave of letters. By way of comparison, John Mohammed, the so-called “D.C. Sniper,” was able to cause mass panic and kill twice as many people (10) by simply purchasing and using one assault rifle. This required far less time, effort and expense than producing the anthrax spores used in the Amerithrax case. It is this cost-benefit ratio that, from a militant’s perspective, makes firearms and explosives more attractive weapons for an attack. This then is the primary reason that more attacks using biological weapons have not been executed: The cost is higher than the benefit. Certainly, history has shown that militant organizations and homegrown militants are interested in large sporting events as venues for terror; one needs to look no further than the 1972 Munich Massacre, the 1980 Olympic Park bombing or even the 2005 incident in which University of Oklahoma student Joel Hinrichs died after a TATP-filled backpack he was wearing exploded outside a football game at Oklahoma Memorial Stadium, to see this. Because of this, vigilance is needed. However, militants planning such attacks will be far more likely to use firearms or IEDs in their attacks than they will biological agents. Unfortunately, in the real world guns and suicide bombs are far more common — and more deadly — than air horns filled with creepy bioterror.

#### Security is a psychological construct—the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other

**Mack ‘91**

Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 \*Gender modified)

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to **participate in acts of violence** they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.

#### Plan isn’t key to deterrence—capability details don’t matter

Jeffrey Lewis, New American Foundation, 2008, Minimum Deterrence, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/minimum\_deterrence\_7552

A different view is that, beyond a certain point, all of this is crazy talk, and the technical details don’t matter very much at all. The balance of terror is anything but delicate. An enemy who can be deterred, will be deterred by the prospect of a counterattack, even if it consists of only a few nuclear weapons. Beyond that minimum threshold, nuclear weapons provide little additional deterrent benefit.

This view, which is often referred to as minimum deterrence, is probably the most prevalent view regarding nuclear strategy -- outside of the small and dwindling group of people who have dedicated their lives to modeling force exchange ratios (how much of an enemy’s war-fighting capacity would survive an attack compared to how much of their own war-fighting capacity would survive) and calculating equivalent megatons. In 1960, strategist Herman Kahn, no great fan of what was then called either “minimum” or “finite” deterrence, was tempted to call it the layman’s view but resisted, because the “view is held by such a surprisingly large number of experts that it may be gratuitously insulting” to use that description.

Kahn had a point. After all, no one could call J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project, a layman. Oppenheimer perfectly expressed the logic of minimum deterrence in response to the growth in U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces in 1953 when he said, “Our twenty thousandth bomb will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two thousandth.” Oppenheimer emphasized numbers, but the argument for minimum deterrence is about more than just arsenal size. At its core, the argument for minimum deterrence has been that, despite the fine calculations of strategic planners, political leaders in particular will recoil at the terrible destructiveness of nuclear war, making the balance of terror quite robust regardless of differences in the number or type of weapons. This certainly is how policy makers tend to talk about nuclear weapons. For example, in Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War, scholar Matthew Evangelista cites a wonderful pair of remarks from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and President Dwight D. Eisenhower that suggest both saw nuclear weapons in terms of minimum deterrence. “Missiles are not cucumbers,” Khrushchev said, “one cannot eat them, and one does not require more than a certain number in order to ward off an attack.” Eisenhower was more precise about that “certain number.” “We should develop a few of these missiles as a threat, but not 1,000 or more,” Eisenhower said. He added that if the Soviet Union and the United States could launch more than that, then “he personally would want to take off for the Argentine.”

## Manufacturing

#### Their advantage is an construction of imperialism used to legitimize colonization under the mantle of economic liberalism

Lipschutz ‘95

Professor of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, On Security, pg 15-17)

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a “secure” global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.43 One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important: the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.44 This would make the world safe and secure for the Untited States inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly. In Iran, for example, the Shah’s efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic “fundamentalism,” now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers’ worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American “security.” The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and “economic security.” What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: “Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence”) shows how strategic economic interdependence – a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle – undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that *have* been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this “new security dilemma,” as Crawford has stylzed it? How can a state generate the conditions for legitimizing various forms of intervention into this process? Clearly, it is not enough to invoke the mantra of “competitiveness”; competition *with* someone is also critical. In Europe, notwithstanding budgetary stringencies, state sponsorship of cutting-edge technological R&D retains a certain, albeit declining, legitimacy in the United States, absent a persuasive threat, this is much less the case (although the discourse of the Clinton Administration suggests that such ideological restraints could be broken). Thus, it is the hyperrealism of Clyde Prestowitz, Karel Van Wolferen, and Michael Crichton, imagining a Japan resurgent and bent anew on (non) Pacific conquest, that provides the cultural materials for new economic policies. Can new industrialized enemies be conjured into existence so as to justify new cold wars and the remobilization of capital, under state direction, that must follow? Or has the world changed too much for this to happen again?

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Conventional paradigms of agricultural and global structures of technological rationality make extinction and the case impacts inevitable

AHMED 2008 – EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR INSTITUTE POLICY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

*HIDDEN HOLOCAUST*, 1-7, <http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/printer_2803.shtml>

3. Food scarcity The convergence of these two global crises, climate change and peak oil, threaten to undermine **global food security** over the next few years. The effects of this are already being felt. At the British Association’s Festival of Science in Dublin in September 2005, US and UK scientists working at the Hadley Centre described how shifts in rain patterns and temperatures due to global warming could lead to a further 50 million people going hungry by conservative estimates. “If we accept that broadly 500 million people are at risk today, we expect that to increase by about 10 percent by the middle part of this century.” [11] Then toward the end of 2006, a study by Met Office’s Hadley Centre funded by the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, predicted that if global warming continues, drought that already threatens the lives of millions will spread across half the land surface of the Earth before 2100, and extreme drought making agriculture impossible will affect a third of the planet. The world-scale drought would undermine the ability to grow food, the ability to have a safe sanitation system, and the availability of water, pushing millions of people already struggling in conditions of dire deprivation over the precipice. [12] The grim truth is that we are already **pushing the limits on world food production** within the existing structure of **modern corporate agriculture.** According to new maps released in December 2005 by scientists at the Centre for Sustainability and the Global Environment (SAGE) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Dr. Navin Ramankutty, “Except for Latin America and Africa, all the places in the world where we could grow crops are already being cultivated. The remaining places are either too cold or too dry to grow crops.” The maps thus show that the Earth is “rapidly running out of fertile land” and that “food production will soon be unable to keep up with global population growth.” World food prediction probably peaked shortly before the new millennium. Lester Brown, a former international agricultural policy advisor for the US government who went on to found the World Watch Institute and Earth Policy Institute, reports that since world grain consumption has exceeded production since 2000, such that 2003 saw a deficit of 105 million tones. On that basis, Brown predicts a global grain deficit within the next few years. In 2003 he noted that “World grain harvests have fallen for four consecutive years and world grain stocks are at the lowest level in 30 years.” This is partly why world grain prices are steadily rising. This is not centrally about population, but about **modern intensive agricultural methods as practiced by the globalized corporate food industry,** which are simply unsustainable. US structural geologist Dave Allen Pfeiffer points out that while it takes 500 years to replace 1 inch of topsoil, in soil made susceptible by modern agriculture, erosion is reducing productivity up to 65 percent each year. Former prairie lands, which constitute the bread basket of the United States, have lost one half of their topsoil after farming for about 100 years. This soil is eroding 30 times faster than the natural formation rate. Soil erosion and mineral depletion removes about $20 billion worth of plant nutrients from US agricultural soils every year. Every year in the US, more than 2 million acres of cropland are lost to erosion, salinization and water logging. Already, populations in the South are suffering from the grim reality of these crises. Near the end of last year, The Guardian reported: “Empty shelves in Caracas. Food riots in West Bengal and Mexico. Warnings of hunger in Jamaica, Nepal, the Philippines and sub-Saharan Africa. Soaring prices for basic foods are beginning to lead to political instability, with governments being forced to step in to artificially control the cost of bread, maize, rice and dairy products. Record world prices for most staple foods have led to 18 percent food price inflation in China, 13 percent in Indonesia and Pakistan, and 10 percent or more in Latin America, Russia and India, according to the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). Wheat has doubled in price, maize is nearly 50 percent higher than a year ago and rice is 20 percent more expensive, says the UN. Next week the FAO is expected to say that global food reserves are at their lowest in 25 years and that prices will remain high for years.” [13] Peak food will be exacerbated beyond all proportion in the context of peak oil. Modern intensive agriculture that produces most of our food, is industrialized, mechanized. It needs oil. Without oil, modern agriculture dies, and so then will our ability to mass-produce food. CONTINUES… The war forward . . . ? All of these global crises are escalating on their own terms as a **direct consequence of the very structure of the global social, political and economic system.** Not only, by their own logic, do they threaten the **future of humanity**, they are currently intensifying and converging over the next few years. While their individual impacts are clearly devastating enough, their **cumulative or simultaneous impact would be so devastating that it is perhaps beyond imagination.**This wide-ranging, but very brief, analysis of social and global systemic crises converging over the ensuing decades ultimately leads us to one major conclusion: the failure of the prevailing social, political and economic system. That we need an alternative is no longer disputable. It is a given, manifest reality. What we need now is a **civilizational paradigm shift.** Not just a new economics, or new politics, or new social vision. **We need a *whole new vision of life itself* to replace the dead, broken materialistic vision associated with the concurrent global imperial system.**

#### Chemical Industry resilient - empirics

Picker 09

Stefan Picker and David Große Kathöfer, editors for the Journal of Business Chemistry, Journal of Business Chemistry, January 2009, "Discussing challenges in the chemical industry for five years", Volume 6, Issue 1,

http://www.businesschemistry.org/article/?article=27

This will likely be even more so the case in the near future, with an omnipresent financial and economic crisis around us, that yet has to unfold its total impact. As a large supplier for most of the highly affected industrial sectors, the chemical industry and all its partners are facing challenging and turbulent times. Measures to cut costs, shrinking markets and severe restructurings will be the effect. However, we are confident that the chemical industry will, in the end, be strengthened. Whatever risks and opportunities the chemical industry will face, the need for a discussion platform on business chemistry issues will only increase. The JoBC hopes it can help to share best practice examples and provide detailed academic analyses of how to act and react in an era of fundamental change.

#### Tech can’t help ag fast enough

Heertsgaard 3-20-13

Mark, Slate Magazine

http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\_tense/2012/04/heat\_resistant\_seeds\_ecological\_agriculture\_growing\_food\_after\_climate\_change\_.single.html

Most peer-reviewed research has found little reason for optimism that GMO seeds will revolutionize yields in the face of climate change. The most authoritative analysis is found in Agriculture at a Crossroads, the landmark report issued by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development in 2009. Testifying before Congress, Robert Watson, the scientist who directed the assessment, explained in the gentlest possible terms that GMO crops are an unproven technology whose benefits remain highly uncertain: “[I]t is likely to be several years at least before these [GMO] traits might reach possible commercial application [my emphasis].” So better seeds alone won’t save us. Instead, feeding the world under climate change will require a broader strategy, grounded in two imperatives. On the one hand, we must rapidly reduce the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, to avoid facing unmanageable amounts of future climate change. On the other, we must prepare our agricultural sectors for the climate impacts already “in the pipeline,” which will be severe enough. The currently dominant system of industrial agriculture is a loser on both fronts. It emits enormous amounts of greenhouse gases, partly because it consumes huge quantities of oil—to power farm equipment, manufacture fertilizer, and ship food through global networks. Meanwhile, its preference for monoculture rather than diversity makes it extremely vulnerable to hot and volatile weather, as well as to the uptick in pests and diseases such weather will bring. “We absolutely have to develop seeds for improved and climate-adapted varieties, but we also need to increase the diversity of seeds,” says Sara Scherr, the president of Ecoagriculture Partners, an NGO in Washington, D.C. (Scherr will also be speaking at the upcoming Future Tense event “Feeding the World While the Earth Cooks.’) “A lot of the focus is on, ‘Let’s get a few seeds that are drought-resistant that can be used on millions of hectares.’ The current business model in agriculture is based on maximizing volume, which militates against diversity.”

#### No China war – cooperation

**Friedberg 5**, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Vice President, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45

Fortunately, a number of the factors to which the optimists point seem likely to continue to act as a brake on what might otherwise be an unchecked slide toward mounting competition and increasingly open confrontation. Assuming that they persist and grow, the mutual gains from an expanding economic relationship will remain the single most important peace-inducing force at work in U.S.-China relations. The potential costs of a conflict between the two powers, especially given that both possess nuclear weapons, should also help to keep competitive impulses within bounds and to make both sides very wary of embarking on any course that could risk direct conflict. The emergence of a group of Chinese “new thinkers” could also contribute to a less zero-sum, hard realpolitik approach to relations with the United States. As with the Soviet Union during the era of perestroika, so also in this case changes in high-level thinking could have a calming effect on bilateral relations, even if they were not accompanied immediately by more profound and far-reaching domestic political reforms.

**Fears of China are based in deep-rooted fears of economics—this makes their impacts more likely—empirically proven**

Lim ’11

(Kean Fan, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, “What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary,” Antipode Journal, Wiley Online Library, AM)

The identification of national-level threats is never straightforward; **it is often effected on emotional rather than evidential grounds**. Within the US, “Japan bashing” emerged during the 1980s vis-`a-vis domestic fears of the **waning economic competitiveness** of the US and its seeming inability to confront a “flexible” postFordist future. More recently, the US decision in 2003 to attack Iraq on the premise that it possessed weapons of mass destruction proved ultimately groundless: no such weapons were found, while Iraq slipped into anarchy and arguably became a hotbed of terrorist activities **only since** (see Fallows 2006; Gregory 2004; ´O Tuathail 2004). Mandel (2008:40) thus rightly cautions how “[t]he political manipulation of enemy images by both government officials and members of the mass public clouds over the stark realities surrounding any international enemy predicament. Together, these patterns create both ambiguity and confusion in dealing with the enemy component of global threat”. In the context of this paper, the critical question is whether a “China threat” imaginary is actually produced by forces beyond China; whether what you see is indeed what you get. Even though the US formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a state in 1979, the recognition was arguably conditioned by latent suspicions. As Feldman (2007:np) puts it, the Reagan administration continued to “put little trust in Chinese promises to adhere to a peaceful solution” regarding Taiwan even as it prepared to sign the 1982 communiqu´e2 with China. This “little trust”, Feldman (2007) adds, explains why Reagan gave Taiwan “Six Assurances” and also inserted a secret memo in the National Security Files noting that Taiwan’s defensive capabilities must be maintained at a level relative to China’s. **Reagan’s legacy of “little trust” seems to have permeated subsequent policy considerations**. In 1999, the Pentagon presented several scenarios in its “Asia 2025” study that portrayed China as the most significant threat to American interests in the Asia-Pacific by 2025. A decade on, the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates offers this analysis of China: In fact, when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the US symmetrically—fighter to fighter or ship to ship—and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options . . . **Investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare**, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballisticmissiles could threaten America’s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups (US Department of Defense 16 September 2009). Gates’ geographical imagination of China in this speech is predicated on two inter-related assumptions that exemplify a political realist “way of seeing”. First, China is not recognized as an “ally” of the US, although it is clear that the US is the key driver of such politics of recognition in the first place. Furthermore, it appears that US military “protection” is a precondition to qualify as an “ally”, a logic which automatically casts states without such “protection” as suspect. Second, China’s military-modernization process is ostensibly a “threat” because such efforts could, in Gates’ terms, “disrupt” the “strategic options” of the US in East Asia, even when it is entirely plausible that increased defense spending is to fulfil other valid purposes, such as replacing obsolete military equipment to address new threats by terrorists and maritime pirates, and enhancing remuneration packages for soldiers. Third, America wants to “project power” on its own terms, which is why it becomes “concerned” when so-called non-allies upgrade their defence technologies. This point is further reaffirmed in the Pentagon’s 2010 **Q**uadrennial **D**efense **R**eview: “**lack of transparency** and the nature of China’s military development and decisionmaking processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond” (Pentagon 2010:60). However, the extent to which the questions are “legitimate” is clearly a unilateral legal-discursive construction of the US that reflects the enduring effect of political realism in US security thought. These assumptions collectively constitute what Bialasiewicz et al (2007; see also Lott 2004) call America’s “performative” security strategy, through which perceived **insecurities are constructed as ontological facts so that “mitigation” measures could be justified**. A critical assessment of the motivations behind China’s military modernization policies is thus necessary before it can be ascertained whether a “China threat” exists. First, while China is not recognized as a US “ally”, it does not justify its defense modernization programs through anti-US rhetoric. For Chinese policymakers, it does appear that the critical issue is protection and consolidation of its existing territories (more on this in the third section). According to Luo Yuan, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and senior researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences, “China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council that has not achieved territorial integrity . . . We need to think more on how to preserve national integrity. We have no intention of challenging the US” (China Daily 4 March 2010). In terms of defense budget, China’s increased 2010 budget, at around US$78 billion, pales in comparison to the proposed expenditure of the US of US$700 billion. Furthermore, the request for China to be “transparent” in its defense policies is a double-standards practice which undermines the sovereign right of a country to devise its own policies, since the Pentagon is not the most “transparent” or accountable where its own policies— **especially the supposed “right” to launch pre-emptive strikes**—are concerned. If anything, then, the massive “power gap” between China and the US should suffice to allay concerns about the former’s so-called “threat” (cf Al-Rodhan 2007). Second, it is interesting that whilst not “allies” in name, the US and Chinese economies are inextricably intertwined as the Chinese government currently generates effective demand for US Treasury financial instruments and holds significant US dollar reserves. In addition, China’s growing geo-economic influence worldwide is contingent on a strategic investment of its foreign reserves**, which means it has every economic incentive to ensure stability** in the global monetary system (see discussion in Lim 2010). Within the US, however, it is possibly this very **geo-economic integration with China** (especially the US Treasury’s increasing dependence on Chinese financial capital and China’s importance as an offshore outsourcing destination for US transnational corporations) which triggers suspicions of China’s “intentions” and which then generate certain reactive measures to deflect attention from the **US economy’s deep-seated problems.** In an insightful analysis, Cohen and DeLong (2010:12–13) argue that the US has had a wonderful opportunity to create new “sectors of the future” because of the willingness of developing countries like China to lend it money; what was created, however, was a finance sector that almost bankrupted the economy and deepened the need for foreign backing to support its “quantitative easing” monetary solution. Because the need to borrow more money from abroad—and China is so far the biggest creditor—could lead to the end of the global politico-economic influence of the US, it is perhaps unsurprising that some political actors choose to politicize this phenomenon. As Waltz (2000:15) puts it, “With zero interdependence, neither conflict nor war is possible. With integration, international becomes national politics”. Then again, if China has no plausible economic motivation to engage in military conflict with the US, the potential for conflict could be attributed to the unilateral and sustained **willingness of the US to accede to Taiwan’s arms purchase requests**, in the knowledge that China views such arms sales as a clear show of support for what it considers its own province. Intriguingly, the US framing of its relations with Taiwan could actually be due to an implicit distrust of putative allies in the East Asian region. Cha (2010:158) theorizes post-World War II US geopolitical alliances with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan as a form of bilateral “powerplay” designed to suppress not only the Soviet threat, but also: to constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the U.S. desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the domino theory—that the fall of one small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism. This strategy arguably applies in the present day, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and China’s peaceful integration into the global political economy. For instance, Christensen (1999:50) sees US military presence in East Asia as resolving a “security dilemma” triggered by a tendency for one country, affected profoundly by “historically based mistrust”, to overreact to another country’s acquisition of ostensibly defensive military equipment. What Christensen (1999) does not emphasize, however, is that the US is also a major exporter of such equipment, which makes the “powerplay” logic a doublethink ratiocination. This echoes Cowen and Smith’s (2009:42) the geopolitical calculations of the US—exemplified through the unilaterally crafted TRA and sustained arms sales to Taiwan—**could** indirectly **destabilize the “China region” and possibly even Sino-US geo-economic formations.** aforementioned caveat that “geopolitical calculation is always available when deemed necessary”. Even though the Cold War is officially over, Johnson’s analysis (2005, in Asia Times Online) strongly suggests that the “powerplay” approach remains in full swing: Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has repeatedly pressured Japan to revise Article 9 of its constitution (renouncing the use of force except as a matter of self-defense) and become what US officials call a “normal nation” . . . America’s intention is to turn Japan into what Washington neo-conservatives like to call the “Britain of the Far East”—and then use it as a proxy in checkmating North Korea and balancing China.

#### No China-Taiwan war

Bush, 10

[Richard C Bush III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “China-Taiwan: Recent Economic, Political, and Military Developments Across the Strait, and Implications for the United States,” 3/18/10, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0318\_china\_economy\_bush.aspx]

What is the trajectory of the current process? Conceptually, there are at least two possibilities. On the one hand, and more consequential, what we are watching might reflect movement toward the resolution of the fundamental dispute between the two sides. One type of resolution would be unification according to the PRC’s one-county, two-systems formula, but there are others. On the other hand, what we are seeing could be the stabilization of cross-Strait relations. That term implies several things: increasing two-way contact, reducing mutual fear, increasing mutual trust and predictability, expanding areas of cooperation, institutionalizing interaction, and so on. It constitutes a shift from the conflicted coexistence of the 1995-2008 period to a more relaxed coexistence. Examples of this process at work are the array of economic agreements that the two sides have concluded, removing obstacles to closer interchange; China’s approval for Taiwan to attend the 2009 meeting of the World Health Assembly; and the two sides’ tacit agreement that neither will steal the other’s diplomatic partners.

In and of itself, stabilization does not lead ineluctably to a resolution of the China-Taiwan dispute—however much Beijing prefers inevitability and however much some in Taiwan fear it. President Ma has been quite explicit that unification will not be discussed during his term of office, whether that is four or eight years. The Chinese leadership at least realizes that the current situation is better than the previous one and understands that resolution will be a long-term process.

Certainly, however, stabilization can create a better climate for resolution. It’s easier to address the tough conceptual issues that are at the heart of this dispute in an environment of greater mutual trust. But I don’t see that happening anytime soon. Stabilization can also evolve very incrementally toward resolution, either through better mutual understanding or because one side, knowingly or unknowingly, makes concessions to the other. How stabilization might migrate to resolution brings me to the Commission’s questions.

China’s Initiatives

Since 2005, and in contrast to past periods, China’s approach to Taiwan has been rather skillful. President Hu Jintao shifted the priority from achieving unification in the near or medium term to opposing Taiwan independence (unification remains the long-term goal). Although he speaks about the need for the two sides to “scrupulously abide by the one-China principle,” he has been prepared, for the sake of achieving substantive progress, to tolerate so far the Ma administration’s quite ambiguous approach to that issue. The Beijing leadership recognizes the importance of building mutual trust through dialogue and exchanges after a decade-plus of mutual fear. It is emphasizing what the two sides have in common—economic cooperation and Chinese culture—and agreed to reduce somewhat the zero-sum competition in the international arena. Through its policies and interactions, it is trying to build up support for a PRC-friendly public on Taiwan. It sees the value of institutionalizing a more stable cross-Strait relationship.

The exception to this trend is the continuation of the People’s Liberation Army’s acquisition of capabilities that are relevant to a Taiwan contingency. Why this build-up continues, in spite of the decline in tensions since President Ma took office, is puzzling. After all, Ma’s policies reduce significantly what Beijing regarded as a serious national security problem. China is more secure today than two years ago, yet it continues to make Taiwan more vulnerable. Possible explanations are rigid procurement schedules; the inability of civilian leaders to impose a change even when it makes policy sense; and a decision to fill out its capacity to coerce and intimidate Taiwan, in case a future Taiwan government challenges China’s fundamental interests. The answer is not clear. I am inclined to believe that it is a combination of the second and third reasons.

What is clear is that this trend is in no one's interests – Taiwan's, China's or the United States'. Taiwan's leaders are unlikely to negotiate seriously on the issues on Beijing's agenda under a darkening cloud of possible coercion and intimidation. The Taiwanese people will not continue to support pro-engagement leaders if they conclude that this policy has made Taiwan less secure. The U.S. will not benefit if mutual fear again pervades the Taiwan Strait.

Where do Current Trends Lead?

To be honest, I do not know. I cannot rule out the possibility that gradually and over time the Taiwan public and political leaders will abandon decades of opposition to one-country, two systems and choose to let Taiwan become a special administrative region of the PRC. But I doubt it. Despite the consciousness on the island of China’s growing power and leverage, there is still a broad consensus that the Republic of China (or Taiwan) is a sovereign state, a position that is inconsistent with China’s formula. Moreover, because of the provisions of the ROC constitution, fundamental change of the sort that Beijing wants would require constitutional amendments and therefore a broad and strong political consensus, which does not exist at this time.

So if political integration is to occur in the next couple of decades, it will occur not because of the cumulative impact of economic integration but because Beijing has decided to make Taiwan an offer that is better than one-country, two systems. So far, I see no sign it will do so.

The more likely future is the continued creation and consolidation of a stabilized order, one in which economic interdependence deepens, social and cultural interaction grows, competition in the international community is muted, and all these arrangements will be institutionalized to one degree or another. But none of this will be automatic. Issues relevant to the resolution of the dispute (e.g. whether Taiwan is a sovereign entity) may come up in the process of stabilization and dealt with in ways that do not hurt either side’s interests And the issue of China’s growing military power—and what it reflects about PLA intentions—remains.

#### Their very attempts to predict China’s reaction to the plan is the link—it cements a positivist epistemology in which China inevitably emerges as a threat

Pan 4—prof school of international and political studies, Deakin U. PhD in pol sci and IR. (Chengxin, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics,” 1 June 2004, http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asia-china/796470-1.html)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist, ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo)realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo)realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other," (45) and "All other states are potential threats." (46) In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other." (47) The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost **by default, China emerges** **as** an absolute other and **a threat** thanks to this (neo)realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy." (50) And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53) In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely.... Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences.... U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. (54) The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China," (55) argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)." (56) It is mainly on the basis of this self-fashioning that many U.S. scholars have for long claimed their "expertise" on China. For example, from his observation (presumably on Western TV networks) of the Chinese protest against the U.S. bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Robert Kagan is confident enough to speak on behalf of the whole Chinese people, claiming that he knows "the fact" of "what [China] really thinks about the United States." That is, "they consider the United States an enemy--or, more precisely, the enemy.... How else can one interpret the Chinese government's response to the bombing?" he asks, rhetorically. (57) For Kagan, because the Chinese "have no other information" than their government's propaganda, the protesters cannot rationally "know" the whole event as "we" do. Thus, their anger must have been orchestrated, unreal, and hence need not be taken seriously. (58) Given that Kagan heads the U.S. Leadership Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is very much at the heart of redefining the United States as the benevolent global hegemon, his confidence in speaking for the Chinese "other" is perhaps not surprising. In a similar vein, without producing in-depth analysis, Bernstein and Munro invoke with great ease such all-encompassing notions as "the Chinese tradition" and its "entire three-thousand-year history." (59) In particular, they repeatedly speak of what China's "real" goal is: "China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia.... China aims at achieving a kind of hegemony.... China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy." (60) Likewise, with the goal of absolute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the [island](http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asia-china/796470-1.html).... This is true because of geography; because of America's reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China's capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense. (61) By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," **a discursive construct from which it cannot escape**. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate." (62) At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. (63) "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] **'they' become 'they' accordingly**." (64) It may be the case that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China (65) or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it. (66) Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how the discursive strategy of perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section, which explores some of the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions of U.S. foreign policy.

# 2NC

## 2nc ov

#### Your obligation is to prioritize the invisible violence of neoliberalism—market society normalizes spectacular violence globally and renders billions disposable—grinding structural inequality is 100% probable and turns the aff

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Global movements against neoliberal hegemony are emerging now and will be effective – the plan’s consolidation of U.S.-driven economic orthodoxy collapses democracy, causes resource wars, environmental collapse, and extinction

Vandana Shiva 12, founder of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Western Ontario, chairs the Commission on the Future of Food set up by the Region of Tuscany in Italy and is a member of the Scientific Committee which advises President Zapatero of Spain, March 1, 2012, “Imposed Austerity vs Chosen Simplicity: Who Will Pay For Which Adjustments?,” online: http://www.ethicalmarkets.com/2012/03/01/imposed-austerity-vs-chosen-simplicity-who-will-pay-for-which-adjustments/

The dominant economic model based on limitless growth on a limited planet is leading to an overshoot of the human use of the earth’s resources. This is leading to an ecological catastrophe. It is also leading to intense and violent resource grab of the remaining resources of the earth by the rich from the poor. The resource grab is an adjustment by the rich and powerful to a shrinking resource base – land, biodiversity, water – without adjusting the old resource intensive, limitless growth paradigm to the new reality. Its only outcome can be ecological scarcity for the poor in the short term, with deepening poverty and deprivation. In the long run it means the extinction of our species, as climate catastrophe and extinction of other species makes the planet un-inhabitable for human societies. Failure to make an ecological adjustment to planetary limits and ecological justice is a threat to human survival. The Green Economy being pushed at Rio +20 could well become the biggest resource grabs in human history with corporations appropriating the planet’s green wealth, the biodiversity, to become the green oil to make bio-fuel, energy plastics, chemicals – everything that the petrochemical era based on fossil fuels gave us. Movements worldwide have started to say “No to the Green Economy of the 1%”.

But an ecological adjustment is possible, and is happening. This ecological adjustment involves seeing ourselves as a part of the fragile ecological web, not outside and above it, immune from the ecological consequences of our actions. Ecological adjustment also implies that we see ourselves as members of the earth community, sharing the earth’s resources equitably with all species and within the human community. Ecological adjustment requires an end to resource grab, and the privatization of our land, bio diversity and seeds, water and atmosphere. Ecological adjustment is based on the recovery of the commons and the creation of Earth Democracy.

The dominant economic model based on resource monopolies and the rule of an oligarchy is not just in conflict with ecological limits of the planet. It is in conflict with the principles of democracy, and governance by the people, of the people, for the people. The adjustment from the oligarchy is to further strangle democracy and crush civil liberties and people’s freedom. Bharti Mittal’s statement that politics should not interfere with the economy reflects the mindset of the oligarchy that democracy can be done away with. This anti-democratic adjustment includes laws like homeland security in U.S., and multiple security laws in India.

The calls for a democratic adjustment from below are witnessed worldwide in the rise of non-violent protests, from the Arab spring to the American autumn of “Occupy” and the Russian winter challenging the hijack of elections and electoral democracy.

And these movements for democratic adjustment are also rising everywhere in response to the “austerity” programmes imposed by IMF, World Bank and financial institutions which created the financial crisis. The Third World had its structural Adjustment and Forced Austerity, through the 1980s and 1990s, leading to IMF riots. India’s structural adjustment of 1991 has given us the agrarian crisis with quarter million farmer suicides and food crisis pushing every 4th Indian to hunger and every 2nd Indian child to severe malnutrition; people are paying with their very lives for adjustment imposed by the World Bank/IMF. The trade liberalization reforms dismantled our food security system, based on universal PDS. It opened up the seed sector to seed MNCs. And now an attempt is being made through the Food Security Act to make our public feeding programmes a market for food MNCs. The forced austerity continues through imposition of so called reforms, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in retail, which would rob 50 million of their livelihoods in retail and millions more by changing the production system. Europe started having its forced austerity in 2010. And everywhere there are anti-austerity protests from U.K., to Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Portugal. The banks which have created the crisis want society to adjust by destroying jobs and livelihoods, pensions and social security, public services and the commons. The people want financial systems to adjust to the limits set by nature, social justice and democracy. And the precariousness of the living conditions of the 99% has created a new class which Guy Standing calls the “Precariate”. If the Industrial Revolution gave us the industrial working class, the proletariat, globalization and the “free market” which is destroying the livelihoods of peasants in India and China through land grabs, or the chances of economic security for the young in what were the rich industrialized countries, has created a global class of the precarious. As Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich have written in “The making of the American 99%”, this new class of the dispossessed and excluded include “middle class professional, factory workers, truck drivers, and nurses as well as the much poorer people who clean the houses, manicure the fingernails, and maintain the lawn of the affluent”.

Forced austerity based on the old paradigm allows the 1% super rich, the oligarchs, to grab the planets resources while pushing out the 99% from access to resources, livelihoods, jobs and any form of freedom, democracy and economic security. It is often said that with increasing growth, India and China are replicating the resource intensive and wasteful lifestyles of the Western countries. The reality is that while a small 3 to 4% of India is joining the mad race for consuming the earth with more and more automobiles and air conditioners, the large majority of India is being pushed into “de-consumption” – losing their entitlements to basic needs of food and water because of resource and land grab, market grab, and destruction of livelihoods. The hunger and malnutrition crisis in India is an example of the “de-consumption” forced on the poor by the rich, through the imposed austerity built into the trade liberalization and “economic reform” policies.

There is another paradigm emerging which is shared by Gandhi and the new movements of the 99%, the paradigm of voluntary simplicity of reducing one ecological foot print while increasing human well being for all. Instead of forced austerity that helps the rich become super rich, the powerful become totalitarian, chosen simplicity enables us all to adjust ecologically, to reduce over consumption of the planets resources, it allows us to adjust socially to enhance democracy and it creates a path for economic adjustment based on justice and equity.

Forced austerity makes the poor and working families pay for the excesses of limitless greed and accumulation by the super rich. Chosen simplicity stops these excesses and allow us to flower into an Earth Democracy where the rights and freedoms of all species and all people are protected and respected.

## 2nc runaway warming—li

#### Try or die—any risk of a link guarantees runaway warming—that causes extinction

Li ‘10

(Minqi, Chinese Political Economist, world-systems analyst, and historical social scientist, currently an associate professor of Economics at the University of Utah “The End of the “End of History”: The Structural Crisis of Capitalism and the Fate of Humanity”, Science and Society Vol. 74, No. 3, July 2010, 290–305)

In 2001, the U. S. stock market bubble started to collapse, after years of “new economy” boom. The Bush administration took advantage of the psychological shock of 9/11, and undertook a series of “preemptive wars” (first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq) that ushered in a new era of intensified inter-state conflicts. Towards the end of 2001, Argentina, which was regarded as a neoliberal model country, was hit by a devastating financial crisis. Decades of neoliberalism had not only undermined the living standards of the working classes, but also destroyed the material fortunes of the urban middle classes (which remained a key social base for neoliberalism in Latin America until the 1990s). After the Argentine crisis, neoliberalism completely lost political legitimacy in Latin America. This paved the way for the rise of several socialist-oriented governments on the continent. After the 2001 global recession, the global economy actually entered into a mini–golden age. The big semi-peripheral economies, the so-called “BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) became the most dynamic sector. The neoliberal global economy was fueled by the super-exploitation of the massive cheap labor force in the semi-periphery (especially in China). The strategy worked, to the extent that it generated massive amounts of surplus value that could be shared by the global capitalist classes. But it also created a massive “realization problem.” That is, as the workers in the “emerging markets” were deprived of purchasing power, on a global scale, there was a persistent lack of effective demand for the industrial output produced in China and the rest of the semi-periphery. After 2001, the problem was addressed through increasingly higher levels of debt-financed consumption in the advanced capitalist countries (especially in the United States). The neoliberal strategy was economically and ecologically unsustainable. Economically, the debt-financed consumption in the advanced capitalist countries could not go on indefinitely. Ecologically, the rise of the BRICs greatly accelerated resource depletion and environmental degradation on a global scale. The global ecological system is now on the verge of total collapse. The world is now in the midst of a prolonged period of economic and political instability that could last several decades. In the past, the capitalist world system had responded to similar crises and managed to undertake successful restructurings. Is it conceivable that the current crisis will result in a similar restructuring within the system that will bring about a new global “New Deal”? In three respects, the current world historical conjuncture is fundamentally different from that of 1945. Back in 1945, the United States was the indisputable hegemonic power. It enjoyed overwhelming industrial, financial, and military advantages relative to the other big powers and, from the capitalist point of view, its national interests largely coincided with the world system’s common and long-term interests. Now, U. S. hegemony is in irreversible decline. But none of the other big powers is in a position to replace the United States and function as an effective hegemonic power. Thus, exactly at a time when the global capitalist system is in deep crisis, the system is also deprived of effective leadership.4 In 1945, the construction of a global “New Deal” involved primarily accommodating the economic and political demands of the western working classes and the non-western elites (the national bourgeoisies and the westernized intellectuals). In the current conjuncture, any new global “New Deal” will have to incorporate not only the western working classes but also the massive, non-western working classes. Can the capitalist world system afford such a new “New Deal” if it could not even afford the old one? Most importantly, back in 1945, the world’s resources remained abundant and cheap, and there was still ample global space for environmental pollution. Now, not only has resource depletion reached an advanced stage, but the world has also virtually run out of space for any further environmental pollution.

## 2nc turns econ

#### Economic engagement within the framework of neoliberalism collapses the global economy

Palley ‘9

Thomas, Schwartz Economic Growth Fellow New America Foundation Washington DC 2009 Editors: Trevor Evans ■ Eckhard Hein ■ Hansjörg Herr ■ Martin Kronauer ■ Birgit Mahnkopf, “America's exhausted paradigm: Macroeconomic causes of the financial crisis and great recession,” http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/59308/1/718077881.pdf

III. THE FLAWED GLOBAL ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT MODEL Though prone to instability (i.e., to boom and bust), the neoliberal growth model might have operated successfully for quite a while longer were it not for a U.S. economic policy that created a flawed engagement with the global economy. This flawed engagement undermined the economy in two ways. First, it accelerated the erosion of household incomes. Second, it accelerated the accumulation of unproductive debt—that is, debt that generates economic activity elsewhere rather than in the United States. The most visible manifestation of this flawed engagement is the goods trade deficit, which hit a record 6.4 percent of GDP in 2006. This deficit was the inevitable product of the structure of global economic engagement put in place over the past two decades, with the most critical elements being implemented by the Clinton administration under the guidance of Treasury secretaries Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers. That eight-year period saw the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the adoption after the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 of the “strong dollar” policy, and the establishment of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China in 2000. These measures cemented the model of globalization that had been lobbied for by corporations and their Washington think-tank allies. The irony is that giving corporations what they wanted undermined the neoliberal model by surfacing its contradictions. The model would likely have eventually slumped because of its own internal dynamic, but the policy triumph of corporate globalization accelerated this process and transformed it into a financial crash. The Triple Hemorrhage Flawed global economic engagement created a “triple hemorrhage” within the U.S. economy. The first economic hemorrhage, long emphasized by Keynesian economists, was leakage out of the economy of spending on imports. Household income and borrowing was significantly spent on imports, creating incomes offshore rather than in the United States. Consequently, borrowing left behind a debt footprint but did not create sustainable jobs and incomes at home. The second hemorrhage was the leakage of jobs from the U.S. economy as a result of offshore outsourcing, made possible by corporate globalization. Such off-shoring directly reduced the number of higher-paying manufacturing jobs, cutting into household income. Moreover, even when jobs did not move offshore, the threat of off-shoring could be used to secure lower wages, thereby dampening wage growth and helping sever wages from productivity growth (Bronfenbrenner, 2000; Bronfenbrenner and Luce, 2004). The third hemorrhage concerned new investment. Not only were corporations incentivized by low foreign wages, foreign subsidies, and under-valued exchange rates to close existing plants and shift their production offshore, they were also incentivized to shift new investment offshore. That did double damage. First, it reduced domestic investment spending, hurting the capital goods sector and employment therein. Second, it stripped the U.S. economy of modern industrial capacity, disadvantaging U.S. competitiveness and reducing employment that would have been generated to operate that capacity. A further unanticipated economic leakage from the flawed model of global engagement concerns energy prices. Off-shoring of U.S. manufacturing capacity has often involved the closing of relatively energy-efficient and environmentally cleaner production and its replacement with less efficient and dirtier foreign production. In addition, the shipping of goods from around the world to the U.S. market has compounded these effects. These developments added to energy demand and contributed to the 2005–08 increase in oil prices, which added to the U.S. trade deficit and effectively imposed a huge tax (paid to OPEC) on U.S. consumers. The flawed model of global economic engagement broke with the old model of international trade in two ways. First, instead of having roughly balanced trade, the United States has run persistent large trade deficits. Second, instead of aiming to create a global marketplace in which U.S. companies could sell their products, its purpose was to create a global production zone in which U.S. companies could either produce or obtain inputs from. In other words, the main purpose of international economic engagement was not to increase U.S. exports, but rather to substitute cheaper imported inputs for US domestic production and to facilitate American-owned production platforms in developing countries that could export to the United States. As a result, at the bidding of corporate interests, the United States joined itself at the hip to the global economy, opening its borders to an inflow of goods and exposing its manufacturing base. This was done without safeguards to address the problems of exchange rate misalignment and systemic trade deficits, or the mercantilist policies of trading partners. The problem is that this new system created a widening hole in US the economy by undermining domestic production, employment, and investment. § Marked 14:20 § That hole accelerated the contradictions in the neoliberal model but those contradictions were held at bay ever more borrowing backed by asset price inflation. When these latter processes exhausted themselves the system collapsed, with the collapse taking the form of a financial crisis. Moreover, since the new arrangement had the global economy joined at the hip to the US economy, this meant the global economy also cratered when the US economy cratered.

## 2nc link

#### We control uniqueness – Cuba provides a successful alternative to neoliberalism because of the Embargo

Fanelli 8

(Carlo, SSHRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Politics & Public Administration, Ryerson University, He received his PhD from the Department of Sociology & Anthropology at Carleton University, “‘Cubanalismo’: The Cuban Alternative to Neoliberalism”, *New Proposals*: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry Vol.2, No. 1 (November 2008) pgs. 7-16)

A closer look at the history of capitalism, however, reveals a much different story than the one being championed by supporters of neoliberalism (Chang 2003). For instance, the majority of today’s advanced industrialized countries of the Global North that are actively championing neoliberalism did not themselves in their early history practice free trade, the removal of tariffs and subsidies, or the retrenchment of the state in order to protect the private interests of capital. Instead, the US and UK, for instance, promoted their national industries through tariffs, subsidies, and an active and intervening role of the state into capitalist ventures (Chang 2003). “These two countries were, in fact, often the pioneers and frequently the most ardent users of interventionalist trade and industrial policy measures in their early stages of development” (Chang 2003:1). One potential explanation for this may be, as the nineteenth century German economist Friedrich List suggests: It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions of navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare the penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth. [cited in Chang, 2003:5] If this is the case, as Chang (2003) proposes more than a century later, the historical evidence suggests that advocates of neoliberalism are indeed “kicking away the ladder” that they used to achieve their current level of development so that a very limited and chosen number of nations may reach relative parity. Debunking the neoliberal myth of free trade from the historical perspective demonstrates the paradox faced by neoliberal economists since the majority of underdeveloped nations in the Global South grew much faster when they used active interventionalist policies from 1960 to 1980, than when they did during the following two decades (Chang 2003). Given the history of capitalist development and the substantial differences that exist between what is preached and what is actually practiced, Cuba has chosen to follow its own path to development based not on free trade and laissez-faire economics, but on one centered on a state-led model of growth that emphasis the social and human responsibilities of economic relations. The three pillars of the Cuban economy are, first, state-led economic development; second, a high concentration of public sector employment; and third, a high degree of tariffs and subsidies in order to promote domestic production and consumption. Much like the early history of their neighbours to the north, Cubanalismo attempts to maintain high and stable trade barriers while protecting their infant industries in order to encourage domestic innovation and a strong industrial sector so as to be self-sufficient and shield the Cuban economy from whirlwind international markets. For the most part, Cuban economists and policy makers oversee the majority of economic activities and decisions. This allows the Cuban economy to remain flexible enough so as to adjust to international fluctuations and changing economic uncertainties both domestically and abroad. As Cuban manufacturing industries gained strength and self-dependence, Cuban officials gradually increased FDI throughout the 199 0s. What separates Cubanalismo from neoliberalism in this respect, is that Cuban officials allowed greater levels of FDI only after Cuban industries had become selfreliant so that they could “stand on their own feet” once productivity levels, efficiency, and quality had been more or less achieved.

#### Our second link is their form of economic engagement---the nickel might seem benign but it’s a resource that generates currency in America which guarantees an element of economic imperialism where the US wants dollar diplomacy and dollar heg—the plan is a mask for US imperialism

Jacobs ‘4 (Jamie Elizabeth, Assistant Prof of Polisci at West Virginia U, "Neoliberalism and Neopanamericanism: The View from Latin America," Latin American Politics & Society 46.4 (2004) 149-152, MUSE)

The advance of neoliberalism suffers no shortage of critics, both from its supporters who seek a greater balance in the interests of North and South, and from its opponents who see it as lacking any real choice for developing states. The spread of neoliberalism is viewed by its strongest critics as part of the continuing expression of Western power through the mechanisms of globalization, often directly linked to the hegemonic power of the United States. Gary Prevost and Carlos Oliva Campos have assembled a collection of articles that pushes this debate in a somewhat new direction. This compilation addresses the question from a different perspective, focusing not on the neoliberal process as globalization but on neoliberalism as the new guise of panamericanism, which emphasizes a distinctly political overtone in the discussion. The edited volume argues that neoliberalism reanimates a system of relations in the hemisphere that reinforces the most negative aspects of the last century's U.S.-dominated panamericanism. The assembled authors offer a critical view that places neoliberalism squarely in the realm of U.S. hegemonic exploitation of interamerican relations. This volume, furthermore, articulates a detailed vision of the potential failures of this approach in terms of culture, politics, security, and economics for both North and South. Oliva and Prevost present a view from Latin America that differs from that of other works that emphasize globalization as a general or global process. This volume focuses on the implementation of free market capitalism in the Americas as a continuation of the U.S. history of hegemonic control of the hemisphere. While Oliva and Prevost and the other authors featured in this volume point to the changes that have altered global relations since the end of the Cold War—among them an altered balance of power, shifting U.S. strategy, and evolving interamerican relations—they all view the U.S. foreign policy of neoliberalism and economic integration essentially as old wine in new bottles. As such, old enemies (communism) are replaced by new (drugs and terrorism), but the fear of Northern domination of and intervention in Latin America remains. Specifically, Oliva and Prevost identify the process through which "economics had taken center stage in interamerican affairs." They [End Page 149] suggest that the Washington Consensus—diminishing the state's role in the economy, privatizing to reduce public deficits, and shifting more fully to external markets—was instead a recipe for weakened governments susceptible to hemispheric domination by the United States (xi). The book is divided into two main sections that emphasize hemispheric and regional issues, respectively. The first section links more effectively to the overall theme of the volume in its chapters on interamerican relations, culture, governance, trade, and security. In the first of these chapters, Oliva traces the evolution of U.S. influence in Latin America and concludes that, like the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny in the past, the prospect of hemispheric economic integration will be marked by a dominant view privileging U.S. security, conceptualized in transnational, hemispheric terms, that is both asymmetrical and not truly integrated among all members. In this context, Oliva identifies the free trade area of the Americas (FTAA) as "an economic project suited to a hemispheric context that is politically favorable to the United States" (20). The chapters in this section are strongest when they focus on the political aspects of neoliberalism and the possible unintended negative consequences that could arise from the neoliberal program. Carlos Alzugaray Treto draws on the history of political philosophy, traced to Polanyi, identifying ways that social inequality has the potential to underminethestable governance that is so crucial a part of the neoliberal plan. He goes on to point out how this potential for instability could also generate a new period of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. Treto also analyzes how the "liberal peace" could be undermined by the "right of humanitarian intervention" in the Americas if the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia served as a model for U.S. involvement in the hemisphere. Hector Luis Saint-Pierre raises the issue of "democratic neoauthoritarianism," responsible for "restricting citizenship to the exercise of voting, limiting its voice to electoral polls of public opinion, restraining human rights to consumer's rights, [and] shutting down spaces to the citizens' participation" (116). While these critiques are leveled from a structuralist viewpoint, they often highlight concerns expressed from other theoretical perspectives and subfields (such as the literature on citizenship and participation in the context of economic integration). These chapters also emphasize the way inattention to economic, social, and political crisis could damage attempts at integration and the overall success of the neoliberal paradigm in the Americas. In general, the section on hemispheric issues offers a suspicious view of the U.S. role in promoting integration, arguing that in reality, integration offers a deepening of historical asymmetries of power, the potential to create new justifications for hegemonic intervention, and the further weakening of state sovereignty in the South. [End Page 150]

## 2nc fw—one-off

#### Be skeptical of their evidence—market forces determine the truth value of knowledge production

Giroux ’13 – Henry, a social critic and educator, and the author of many books. He currently holds the Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Ontario. “Public Intellectuals Against the Neoliberal university”; October 29, 2013; <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/19654-public-intellectuals-against-the-neoliberal-university>

Across the globe, the forces of casino capitalism are on the march. With the return of the Gilded Age and its dream worlds of consumption, privatization and deregulation, not only are democratic values and social protections at risk, but the civic and formative cultures that make such values and protections crucial to democratic life are in danger of disappearing altogether. As public spheres, once enlivened by broad engagements with common concerns, are being transformed into "spectacular spaces of consumption," the flight from mutual obligations and social responsibilities intensifies and has resulted in what Tony Judt identifies as a "loss of faith in the culture of open democracy."4 This loss of faith in the power of public dialogue and dissent is not unrelated to the diminished belief in higher education as central to producing critical citizens and a crucial democratic public sphere in its own right. At stake here is not only the meaning and purpose of higher education, but also civil society, politics and the fate of democracy itself. Thomas Frank is on target when he argues that "Over the course of the past few decades, the power of concentrated money has subverted professions, destroyed small investors, wrecked the regulatory state, corrupted legislators en masse and repeatedly put the economy through the wringer. Now it has come for our democracy itself."5 And, yet, the only questions being asked about knowledge production, the purpose of education, the nature of politics, and our understanding of the future are determined largely by market forces.

The mantras of neoliberalism are now well known: Government is the problem; Society is a fiction; Sovereignty is market-driven; Deregulation and commodification are vehicles for freedom; and Higher education should serve corporate interests rather than the public good. In addition, the yardstick of profit has become the only viable measure of the good life, while civic engagement and public spheres devoted to the common good are viewed by many politicians and their publics as either a hindrance to the goals of a market-driven society or alibis for government inefficiency and waste.

#### We solve serial policy failure—prioritize critique to hypothetically saving lives, policy makers face unique constraints nonexistent in debate like time constraints—urgency means we can’t have discussions

Bilgin 4

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4 (“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas 'something' needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, **it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of 'short-termism' in the conduct of current policy**. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as 'approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation'. Viewed as such, **short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking**. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating. The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state 'failure'. Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of 'state failure' in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa'eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, 'strong'/'weak' states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). **The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is** the one of **choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision**. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information. Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the 'war on terror' be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories. Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode 'wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds', towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to 'failed states', the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of 'failure' raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attentionfrom **practitioners across the academy** and policymaking communities alike.

#### Fiat is an independent reason to vote negative—strips meaning to life which access the root cause of all of their impacts

Shaffer 7

(Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars. “Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007. <http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html>)

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions **external to our independent being**. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to **internalize these external forces;** to **conform our thinking** and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. **Once we identify ourselves with the state**, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; **it is who we are**. To the politicized mind, **the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning**, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but **in the psychological sense**. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political **officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state**. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to **invest** our **lives** and the lives of our children **in** the **collective** **madness** of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the **meaning** and direction **in our lives, but** of the manner in which we can be efficacious in **our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us**.We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people - we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The **state** has **trained** **us** to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies **in** **pursuit** **of** the **enemy** du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. **Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being**. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. **We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us** – without division and conflict – **to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.**

#### Critical intellectualism solves extinction—the ballot matters

Jones ‘99

IR, Aberystwyth (Richard, “6. Emancipation: Reconceptualizing Practice,” Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. **This** task **is accomplished through educational activity**, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual–moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332–333) According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual–moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolò Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtù–ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern prince could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125–205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict. 1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security–related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short–term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security**, a far more important result in the long run.** The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse–Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse–Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectual communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center–left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52–54; Risse–Kappen 1994: 196–200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse–Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse–Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard–liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse–Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90–110) Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and **intellectuals** persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least **have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior.** The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East–West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse–Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin, and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse–Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East–West relations in order to facilitate much–needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223–260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to **shift the parameters of the debate** in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonstrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution of society. Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’état the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full–square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self–consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures—can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323–377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, half man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and through which ruling or dominant ideas become widely dispersed. 2 In particular, Gramsci describes how ideology becomes sedimented in society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. **Obviously**, for Gramsci, **there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change.** In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well–worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229–239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive **social change requires** a slow, **incremental**, even **molecular, struggle** to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. The Tasks of Critical Security Studies If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of a war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while **drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking** about security behind its positivist facade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116–121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing a part in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant punditry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture.... As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical **dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against**. Rather, **through** their **educational** **activities**, proponents of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, **critical theorists** can **perform a valuable role in** supporting the struggles of **social movements**. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also Cortright 1993: 5–13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naive to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49–62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk–averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

#### Their FW is politically disempowering—fiat lets us off the hook for our own responsibility in cultivating social change

Kappeler 95

(Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. *(QT,* 33) 10 Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential*,* not technological. 11 **It is a matter of how** **human** being**s are fundamentally oriented toward their** **world** vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. 12

## 2nc fw da

Their fixation with policymaking is underpinned by neoliberal rationality—the ideological partition between the haves and have-nots structures policy-making—it’s zero-sum which is a DA to the perm.

Gunder & Hillier ‘9 (Michael, Senior planning lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, Jean, Professor of Town and Country Planning at School of Architecture, Newcastle University, *Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning*, pgs. 111-112)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes *their* desired enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy. Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues. Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their 'dominant stakeholders' can ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many, whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and Hillier 2007a, 469). The current 'post-democratic' milieu facilitates the above through avoidance of critical policy debate challenging favoured orthodox positions and policy approaches. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative 'solutions', are eradicated from political debate so that while' token institutions of liberal democracy are retained, conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003, 59). Consequently, 'the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are repeatedly used, or their work drawn upon, by different stakeholders, while more critical voices are silenced by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007, 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox 'successful' or 'best practice' economic development or spatial planning responses. This further maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo while providing 'a cover and shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the political field from any research that is independent and radical in its conception as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time, adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses for every competing local area or city-region, largely resulting in a zero-sum game (Blair and Kumar 1997)*.* In the race for global competitiveness, city-region authorities continue toprioritise economic development and supporting spatial planning policies. Theymaintain the dominant *status quo* by appearing to increase the happiness of material well being for all. The state, its local government and its governance structures,must be seen to be doing something to justify their existence. In addition, andperhaps more importantly, public sector actions, which give the appearance ofdoing something to improve the local economy and the city-region's amenity,actually address the (primal) desire of most people in society for at least the illusionof a safe and assured happy future of security and prosperity. Even if practitionerscan only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario by providing the potential of a limitedmaterial increase in happiness for some, even when this may not really be whatis actually wanted, this type of response is more acceptable to politicians and thevoting public than is the truth that to sate the wants and desires of everyone is an impossibility (Gunder 2003a, 2003b).

That independently causes extinction.

Szentes ‘8(Tamás, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf)

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus **paving the way for** unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the **final, last catastrophe.** One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society **cannot survive** unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

#### Our resistance in pedagogical circles as students is key—only way to ever challenge elitist knowledge domination—this promotes democratic change that offers the only hope of a radical shift from neoliberalism

Giroux ‘13

Henry, a social critic and educator, and the author of many books. He currently holds the Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Ontario. This article is adapted from America’s Education Deficit and the War on Youth, forthcoming, Monthly Review Press, “Violence, USA The Warfare State and the Hardening of Everyday Life,” Monthly Review Volume 65, Number 1 (M ay 2013)

The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global network of violence it has produced. Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics restored to a level where it can make a difference in fulfilling the promises of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if the political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center stage in the struggle for desires, subjectivities, and social relations that refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of gratification, entertainment, identity, and honor. War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the production of widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced from public values and the formative cultures that make a democracy possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the United States as both a warfare and a punishing state, I am not appealing to a form of left moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance. What is needed are modes of analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the effects of the merging of institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a military-industrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex of ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of violence must be addressed by making visible its vast national and global interests and militarized networks, as indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000 military bases abroad.54 Equally important is the need to highlight how this military-industrial-carceral and academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national policy and everyday life. Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational component. C. Wright Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only “guide experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”55 This narrowing of experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified, and increasingly militarized. Social responsibility gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility. Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is, therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens. Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education, which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role, educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational, military, market, and religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls “a new grammar of political disobedience.”56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature and substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful. Critical understanding motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity, and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange. Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society “in which the production and circulation of death functions as political and economic recovery.”57 The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this machinery of violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than death—the future of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture. It is time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that: the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making clear that this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive use of digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of young people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic. Any viable challenge to the new authoritarianism and its theater of cruelty and violence must include developing a variety of cultural discourses and sites where new modes of agency can be imagined and enacted, particularly as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of sociality, and “alternative conceptualizations of the self and its relationship to others.”59 Clearly, if the United States is to make a claim to democracy, it must develop a politics that views violence as a moral monstrosity and war as virulent pathology. How such a claim to politics unfolds remains to be seen. In the meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of democratic life.

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Emmanuel, School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, A. A. Arhin, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, T. Yeboah Centre of Development Studies, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, “Can post-2015 sustainable development goals survive neoliberalism? A critical examination of the sustainable development–neoliberalism nexus in developing countries”

3 The paradox of the neoliberal economic agenda

Neoliberalism as a hegemonic political and economic discourse has swept the development arena in developing countries, making it almost impossible for any country to claim immunity from its influences (Klein 2010). Proponents maintain that market-based strategies promote efficiency, competition and stabilisation of the economy (Easterly 2005). Nevertheless, **empirical studies** on neoliberalism and market efficiency challenge the arguments of the neoliberals (Harvey 2007 and Morris and Klesner 2010). Harvey’s critique lies in the fact that market mechanisms have become a vehicle for **promoting** **monopoly power rather than competition** especially state-based monopoly in the supply of utility services in Mexico. Moreover, the increasing consolidation of monopoly is evident in the corporatisation and privatisation of water services by few private companies in South Africa (Narsiah and Ahmed 2012). Furthermore, country-specific case studies in Argentina and Brazil illustrate that corruption has become rampant since the introduction of privatisation and liberalisation policies (Manzetti and Blake 1996). Adopting a market-based solution removes the regulatory mechanisms by the state, **creating an avenue for corruption**. For example, Rudel (2005) has observed that market-based solutions of forest protection promote an increase in illegal logging because government officials who benefit from corrupt practices are unwilling to prevent illegal loggers. On these account, it could be argued that the implementation of neoliberal polices in promoting market efficiency in most developing countries has been far from being

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